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Sunday 09
December 2001 - IranMania.com
The Enigma of Reza Pahlavi
Why does Reza Pahlavi get so much media attention?
Why does the mere mention of his name bring up so much lively
debate on web sites, Internet chat rooms, Iranian TV and radio
shows?
Why did people hail Reza Pahlavi as their leader during the
recent disturbances in Iran?
Why is there a ban on the mention of the name of
"Shah" in the Islamic Republic's press?
According to some of his critics Reza Pahlavi is a common
unemployed suburban father, or as Elaine Sciolino of the New
York Times claims a "footnote in history."
Other denouncers claim that Reza Pahlavi has a total of two to
three thousand followers worldwide mostly composed of toothless
balding octogenarian imperial generals and corrupt former
courtiers in Paris, London and Los Angeles and is therefore
"white noise" in Iranian political statistics.
Unlike most Iranians who generally first prepare the answers and
then ask the questions, I have to admit that I do not know how
many people would vote for Reza Pahlavi if there was a
referendum held today nor do I claim to know the answer to some
of the questions above.
It does however seem logical to assume that Reza Pahlavi has an
important view point on Iranian politics if the CNN, the BBC,
Newsweek, Washington Post, Wall Street Journal, the Guardian,
the Independent, the Daily Telegraph and LeMonde interview him
or write about him.
After all, Iran has a former president of the Islamic Republic,
former prime ministers, heads of Marxist and Islamist guerilla
organizations, leaders of the secular national front, followers
of Bazargan, dismayed former revolutionary guards, radical
supporters of Khatami all in exile and in opposition to the
Islamic Republic.
Why are not they the subject of such intense scrutiny?
The typical Iranian answer is a variation of the all too
familiar conspiracy theory.
The old CIA, Mossad, MI6 network is up to it again to have
another 28th of Mordad.
On a saner note, even if such conspiracies did in fact exist,
can the theorists come forward and explain why would the CIA
select a man that they claim is a "has been" jet
setter with no followers, tribe or army?
I think the rational possibility to explore is that Reza Pahlavi
has a rather sizable constituency inside and outside Iran and
his popularity is neither a foreign plot nor a passing trend but
is caused by profound socio economic changes in Iran. This
however raises other questions.
Was not there a genuine revolution in Iran where people
overthrew the monarchy?
There is no question that we had a populist revolution in Iran
with the specific aim of toppling the Pahlavi regime. This was
no sinister plot of the British or the CIA.
There is however nothing noble or legitimizing about a
revolution. Societies can make mistakes the same way that their
components i.e. individuals make mistakes. Hitler, Mussolini and
Stalin all came to power through popular revolutions with
disastrous consequences for their societies.
The fact that the Iranian modern middle class threw in their lot
with the Mollahs twenty-three years ago does not mean that the
new generation has not learnt from the past and should be
condemned to repeat their mistake and not change course.
Did not people turn out recently in millions to elect Khatami as
their president?
Without a doubt the election of Mohammed Khatami had the full
hearted support of the Iranian people.
However once the post election euphoria subsided, the realities
of the Islamic republic became apparent. The army, security
apparatus, revolutionary guards and the judiciary remained under
the firm control of the Vali Faghih who answers to no one but
God. As a result 4 years later, the independent press is shut
down, the prisons are filled with writers, students and the so
called loyal opposition who were all Khatami's backers. There
have been no economic reforms, unemployment has actually become
worth and corruption even within the administration is as
rampant as before Khatami.
It is rather symbolic that the student movement leaders of the
Office of Consolidated of Unity (Daftar e Tahkim Vahdat), who
were staunch supporters of Khatami, began speaking of
"transition from Khatami" to democracy (Gozar az
Khatami.) in 2001 after Khatami's second election. As a result,
their leaders were subsequently arrested, tortured and forced
into televised cofessions and the organization was declared
illegal.
In practice the Khatami presidency's main achievements can be
summarized in the women's right to wear nail polish, a couple of
trips by the President to Europe, an oil concession to Royal
Dutch Shell and a lot of hot air.
On a theoretical level, Khatami at its best is the embodiment of
the hypothesis that Islam and modernity may be compatible.
Khatami's election was a test of Soroush's theory that liberal
interpretations of religion may lead to an Islamic democracy.
This theory had serious flaws and religious democracy never had
a chance to begin with. Protestantism saved Christianity in some
parts of the world but did not lead to separation of church and
state which is a prerequisite of democracy.
In other words, a liberal interpretation of religion may save
Islam from extinction but for democratic institutions to
flourish, religion, liberal or dogmatic, needs to be driven out
of the state apparatus.
In fact, Sorush and people in his "Kian" magazine
circle were the first to recognize the underlying flaw of their
theory.
I had a first impression of that when Sorush the Islamic
revivalist who was calling Ghazali, Mowlavi, Shariati and
Khomeini his intellectual models in his earlier books came full
circle in 1999 and called Mohammed Ali Foroughi's "Seyr-e
Hekamt dar Europa" which is a history of western philosophy
as the greatest philosophical work ever done by a contemporary
Iranian.
The failure of Khomeini style fundamentalism and now Khatami's
Islamic reformism to address and resolve the Iranian society's
main problem of backwardness has now opened new vistas in
Iranian politics. The questions which many rightfully ask are:
Supposing Islam as a form of government failed why would the
Iranian people want to revert to monarchy?
Supposing that constitutional monarchy is a suitable form of
government for Iran why should it be the Pahlavis again?
Who are Reza Pahlavi's constituents in or outside Iran?
I think one of the common mistakes is to confuse the Pahlavi
regime with absolute oriental monarchies that we have had
throughout our history in the form that they currently exist in
Saudi Arabia or the Persian Gulf Sheikdoms such as the United
Arab Emirates.
The oriental monarchy died in Iran when a mere commoner
assassinated the Shadow of God on earth, the Pinnacle of the
Universe, Nasser Eddin Shah. That famous shot in the
ShahAbdolazim shrine rang the death knell of the divine right of
the Sultan once and for all.
Since its inception, the Pahlavi regime was at the same time a
product and promoter of Iran's embryonic modern middle class.
The men who founded and later staffed the Pahlavi regime were
not aristocrats, feudal landlords or tribal leaders. They had
not ridden on horses to conquer and loot new territories.
Davar, Foroughi or Taghizadeh, just to name a few, were all
educated radical constitutionalists from middle class
backgrounds. They constituted the cream of the crop of Iran's
intelengensia. They were well versed in Persian literature and
Islamic doctrine and at the same time had an intimate knowledge
of western political thought and philosophy. Without an
exception, these men were scrupulously honest with almost a
Sufi's disdain for the trappings of power. Many of them died not
even owning their homes.
They all had a purely secular agenda even though many of them
such as Kasravi, Taqizadeh or Akhavi came from clerical
families. As such, they had first hand experience of the
degrading primitiveness, misplaced self-righteousness,
nauseating bigotry, sanctimonious hypocrisy and shameless
corruption of the Mollas.
These men had a vision for the modernization of Iran.
The experience of the constitutional revolution and its chaotic
aftermath where Iran's existence as a sovereign nation was
threatened had taught them that democracy could not flourish
before economic development. In other words, first there had to
be an Iran, second it had to have an economy and third people
needed to be literate and then there could be meaningful
elections and democracy.
In a way, they were the Iranian pioneers of the South Asian or
Japanese model of modernization. They believed that to modernize
and save Iran from impending disaster, they had to acquire
western thoughts, philosophies and technologies.
Their patriotism was positive and oriented towards opening Iran
to the world.
They painfully recognized that the traditional Persian culture
that they so much loved had become too isolated and inward
looking and needed updating.
After all as Dariush Shayegan says:" We had taken a
vacation from human history for the last thousand years."
What transpired in Iran over the next half century is simply the
implementation of that vision.
The Pahlavi regime was not a military dictatorship. The army
chiefs were never devising social or economic policies. They
were tools in the hands of the intellectuals.
In his memoirs, Ali Akabar Siassi, the founder and future
president of Tehran University has a telling passage. He and his
friends, all educated middle class intellectuals formed a
political club and wrote a charter. Reza Shah heard of their
activities and called Siassi for a meeting. Reza Shah asked a
young intimidated Siassi rather testingly about their
activities. Siassi read the charter which called for the
reorganization of the army and bureaucracy, a secular judiciary,
new modern schools and universities, establishment of heavy
basic industries etc.
Reza Shah then smiled, congratulated him and told him:
_"You the young educated patriots make the plans and I the
old soldier promise you that I will implement them. (Fekr az
shoma, Kar az man)."
Arguably the union of the old provincial soldier and the young
cosmopolitan intellectuals was the best thing which happened to
Iran in its entire post Islamic history. They accomplished the
impossible.
In a span of sixteen years, out of the rubble of an old decaying
oriental empire, they built a modern state. They built a strong
army, an effective bureaucracy, a secular and clean judiciary,
schools, universities, railroads, hospitals, dams, factories,
hotels.
They did that without a cent of foreign debt, minimal oil
revenues, a largely illiterate and scattered populace and a
skeleton staff of college graduates. They did not attempt
utopian social engineering. There was no mass genocide of the
ancient regime. There were no periodic Stalinist purges. There
was no foreign adventurism.There was no ethnic or religious
stereotyping and cleansing.
They gave Iran the self respect and national pride that it had
lost for hundreds of years.
A disciplinarian model of development had its costs. Bringing a
nation out of the abyss did require sacrifice. Some of these
young men ended up in jail, exile or internal disgrace.
Democratic institutions never sprang up. Reza Shah did
confiscate some of his adversaries private property.
The benefits however were far greater than the costs and Iran
definitely gained.
Like his father Mohamad Reza Shah was never an oriental Sultan,
unlike his father he was never a pure soldier. More than
anything Mohamad Reza Shah was a technocrat whose sole aim in
life was to finish the job that Davar and Foroughi had started.
Neither Davar and his friends, nor Reza Shah or Mohamad Reza
Shah ever thought that Iran's priority was democracy. They never
promised democracy. They promised economic development and they
delivered it. In retrospect, there had to be a measure of
political development accompanying the building of the country
but there was no question that the mandate given to the Pahlavis
was first and foremost the rebuilding of the country's
infrastructure and raising its standard of living.
The popularity of Reza Pahlavi is more than anything a result of
Iran's changing demographics.
In 1978 40% of Iran's population were city dewelers and 50% of
them had emigrated to the cities in the last 5 years before the
revolution. As a result over 80% of Iran's population had a
traditional village mentality.
They did not understand modern values because they did not have
modern needs. The Mollas were their traditional leaders. The aim
of the revolution was therefore not freedom or development but
the reinstatement of traditional values such as the veil.
It was not therefore surprising that Iran's educated modern
middle class regardless of their political persuasions had to
leave Iran or became pariahs at home once Mohamad Reza Shah
left.
Today 70% of Iran's population are city dewelers. In the years
since the revolution the absence of Modernity has brought them
unemployment, lack of civic services, absence of a real
judiciary etc.
As a result, the modernization paradigm which 80 years ago only
belonged to the educated elite has now become the common man's
objective except they want to achieve "Davar's Dream"
within a democratic framework.
The other important change is the age of the Iranian population.
Fifty percent of all Iranians have been born after the
revolution and have absolutely no idea of the revolutionary era.
They want social and political freedoms, jobs. The Islamic
Republic has failed to deliver and they are looking for an
alternative.
The reason that Reza Pahlavi has emerged as the leader of the
new modern middle-class movement in Iran is not because educated
Iranians have suddenly become fond of Oriental Sultans fully
equipped with seraglios, eunuchs, concubines and henchmen.
Reza Pahlavi is a symbol of an alternative vision for Iran, the
continuation of a political dynasty which successfully delivered
the economic development side of the equation and never lied to
Iranians.
The question that many ask is whether Reza Pahlavi can deliver
"Davar's Dream" within a democratic framework.
The structuring of a democratic framework depends on the method
that power is transferred. If the power is transferred through
non violent means such as a campaign of civil disobedience and
ultimately a UN sponsored referendum, the means of a coercive
takeover of the state will simply not exist for any group,
monarchist, republican or otherwise.
The argument that Reza Pahlavi by virtue of his pedigree and
name recognition cannot lead a democratic movement thus becomes
baseless.
The fact that you have the political families of Bush, Gore,
Kennedy or Roosevelt in the United States or the Francois
Poncets in France or the Churchills in England or the Buttos in
Pakistan or the Gandis in India just to name a few has not been
an obstacle to democracy in their respective countries. |
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