Fereydoun Hoveyda Speaks His Heart and Mind on the Issues
Extracts of an Interview with Mark Dankof
Mark Dankof states: it was left to Mr. Hoveyda to willingly remain in
Iran to defend his own personal honor and legacy on behalf of the Iranian
nation before the legal and moral equivalent of a lynch mob. History will
record that he did so successfully, as chronicled in Dr. Abbas Milani’s
blockbuster of a book, The Persian Sphinx.
On Iran
“I will repeat what has already been said by others about Iran.
And that is that no one, not even Iranians themselves, understands Iran
. . . . At one level, the 1979 Islamic Revolution was the outcome of
a personal struggle between two men, Shah Muhammed Reza Pahlavi and Ayatollah
Ruhollah Khomeini.
Each of them partially represented one of the key, basic, contradictory
trends that agitated the nation since the early years of the twentieth
century—secularist modernization on the one hand, in juxtaposition
with religious orthodoxy and traditionalism on the other.
In my new book coming out this fall, The Shah
and the Ayatollah: Iranian Mythology and Islamic Revolution, I discuss
many of the angles and the pieces of this complex puzzle that are largely
unknown to the Western world and mind. These include the fact that the
Iranian mindset has not changed over the centuries. Its identity has survived
the Greek hordes under Alexander the Great, along with the Arab and Mongol
invasions. This sense of permanence might appear to provide some semblance
of stability, yet in another way, Iranians are prisoners of this permanence
and its accompanying world view. The book will cover key areas for Western
education and discernment in these matters. These include the influence
of Zoroastrianism and its concept of ‘savior’; the historical
pattern of change of leadership set by the legend of ‘Jamshid and
Zahak’; the ‘Rostam Syndrome’ in dichotomous relationship
to the Western ‘Oedipal complex’ mythology; the resemblance
of the ‘Hidden Imam’ in Iranian Shiite doctrine to the ‘Shayoans’
in the Zoroastrian belief system; the ‘Tripartite ideology’
of Indo-Europeans and the ‘caste system’ as a model of social
organization; the Modernization movements in Iran and their 20th century
failures; the ‘repetition-compulsion’ character of Iranian
history; the influence of Sigmund Freud’s ‘Fate Neurosis’
as a possible influence on the character of Iranian society; the influence
of Shiite Islamic mythology on Iranians; the mainstream Shiite concept
of Government as belonging to the ‘Hidden Imam’; Khomeini’s
special interpretation of the Shiite concept of Government; the differences
between Shiite and Sunni Islam; the significance of the rumors that Khomeini
was the ‘Hidden Imam’; the legends and myths about the 12
Shiite Imams and their resemblance to ancient mythology; and the whole
notion of whether or not there is a ‘curse’ on Iran’s
history.
“At this point, there are two points I wish to emphasize for your
readers. One is that the Iranian revolution was, in fact, started by ‘secular
liberals.’ It was ‘hijacked’ by Khomeini and the Islamic
mullahs. The revolution should be considered in the context of the fight
between secular, reformist elements in Iranian society on the one hand,
and Islamic radicals seeking an iron grip on the Iranian people and nation.
What happened in 1978-79 was a unique combination of historical and political
circumstances with mythical and religious beliefs.
Second, I do look at the future of Iran. I believe there is a bright
future for Iran, based on showing Iranians how, with the help of their
ancient mythology, they can replace Islamic theocracy with a truly democratic
government rooted in tolerance and dialogue.”
One must remember that it was the Americans who put pressure on the Shah
to leave Iran.
“For example, the place and role of the ‘father’ in
Iranian society is very different from that of other Middle Eastern patriarchs
and tribal chieftains, as it is a divergence from the Western model as
well. Iran’s ‘father myth’ is the exact opposite of
the Oedipus legend. You will recall that Dr. Abbas Milani discussed this
in the book about my brother, The Persian Sphinx. He mentions that in
the Western Oedipus myth, the son kills the father. But in the Iranian
Shahnameh, the father, Rostam, kills his son, Sohrab. It is a metaphor
for the victory of the patriarch.
The Iranian ‘father’ is an omnipotent autocratic figure whose
authority cannot be questioned by his offspring. His absolute power is
ingrained in Iranian mythology and is a major key in understanding what
has happened in that nation.”
In the 1970s, he was training Iranians in his terrorist camps in Lebanon
and helped Khomeini gain power in Iran. He lent his PLO representative
in Paris to Khomeini. Ghotbzadeh became the Ayatollah’s spokesman
in exile and later, his foreign minister in Tehran. Arafat’s Palestinian
fighters participated in demonstrations against the Shah’s regime.
In 1979, they were around the mullahs, in charge of security in the ministries
and other public buildings. Arafat became the first foreign dignitary
to visit and kiss the hand of the Ayatollah before joining forces with
Saddam Hussein in the war against Iran! This is the caliber of man and
human being we are talking about here, who brings misery and bloodbath
to Palestinian, Lebanese, Iranian, American, and Israeli victims alike.”
On the Legacy of Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi
“The legend of Jamshid in the Shahnameh provides a fundamental explanation
to the tragedy of this man. Jamshid’s reported advances on behalf
of the Iranian nation were followed by his conceit and his ultimate decision
to demand the literal worship of the people. Jamshid’s actions cause
the blessings of Ahura Mazda (Zoroastrian god of Light) to be withdrawn,
followed by the judgments of Ahriman (Zoroastrian embodiment of evil).
The Shah’s 1971 festival at Persepolis followed the pattern of Jamshid,
including the cult of self-deification. He took credit for any and all
of the advances made in Iran. He stopped acknowledging the obvious help
and contribution of the United States in this historical process. He forgot
the group of liberal reformers within his country, which included Amir
Abbas, in their collective contribution to the attempt to bring Iran into
the modern, scientific, technological era. The Shah, like Jamshid, became
a despotic autocrat, with identical, tragic results. He was abandoned
by God (Ahura Mazda in the analogy), and Khomeini came. All of this shows
that there must be a complete break with the circular past. There must
be a political and cultural alternative in Iran that is neither Achaemenid
kingship nor Islamic theocracy, but the development of an honest Republic.
If this change does not occur, Iran is doomed. The economic downturn and
the well publicized brain drain from Iran to the West will be accelerated
if there is not a third alternative to these elements of a failed, tragic
past. But it must not be an attempted copy of European or American constitutional
models, but a constitutional republican model that takes account of the
unique role and influence of Iranian mythologies. But the entire Islamic
world has a problem with autocratic kings. This must be changed. And without
saying that the United States is perfect, for we are only too aware of
the defects, it must be said to the Islamic world that the American commitment
to freedom of speech, and the removal of religious influence from its
Constitution, are two of the key principles that must govern any political
and economic renaissance in the Islamic world . Despite the corruption
of the American Congress and Wall Street, the fundamental concepts in
the American Constitution still hold, and make the United States the most
unique place in the world. The Iranian expatriate community in the United
States must grasp this reality, and not make the mistake of searching
for solutions for Iran in antiquated, nostalgic notions from Iran’s
distant past.
“Now, in terms of this man [the Shah], I remember my last conversation
with my brother on the telephone after the Shah’s departure. My
brother was appalled that this man would run away from his historic responsibilities
to defend the interests of his nation during a crisis, and to argue the
merits of his own motives and legacy. A captain of a ship must be willing
to go down with it, if he must. This is his responsibility. Shah Mohammed
Reza Pahlavi, in history, will always be tainted because he abdicated
his responsibilities at a most crucial juncture in the history of the
Iranian nation. He will never escape this historical evaluation–ever.
Iran had 4 kings in the 20th century, two were Qajar dynasty and two were
Pahlavi dynasty. When things got difficult, all 4 failed to die in their
boots. They all died in their beds. So who needs these types of kings
again, or kingship? Iran needs a different way.”
On Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi
“He will suffer from two deficiencies. I think he is probably a
nice man, but his father’s legacy of avoiding responsibility and
fleeing his own country will follow the Prince as well, even if that is
ultimately unfair. This is the way it is. He has the legacy of the last
name. Second, I must confess that I find this young fellow to be somewhat
superficial in the things he says about Iran’s future and his own
role in it. Talking about democracy and economic reform are fine, but
I can’t say that I truly believe that this man has any constructive,
deep ideas about how to achieve this, or how to spearhead such a movement
through his personal leadership. These are ultimately fatal flaws in any
analysis of Reza Pahlavi’s chances of leading Iran into a new way,
a new era. That is my verdict.”
On the Legacy of Amir Abbas Hoveyda
“Amir, like many of us of the same generation in Iran with Western
educations, believed that the development of an economic infrastructure
in Iran was the necessary ingredient and prelude to the development of
a political superstructure that would sustain political reform and the
development of a Constitutional model along the lines of the European
ones, with special deference of course to Iranian culture and mythologies.
Despite his, and our best efforts, the subsequent failures in this regard
made me aware of what I had begun to see in the early 1960s–that
ultimately Iran was a prisoner of its own mythologies.
Now in terms of my brother’s death, he understood that he must
remain in Iran, to defend his record and to continue there as a positive
presence for reform for the people of that country. He also believed,
mistakenly, that there would be a fair trial in which he would demonstrate
that he had nothing to hide, and plenty to testify about in terms of his
role and motives in history. It is this legacy of remaining, and testifying,
at the ultimate cost of his life, that will forever distinguish my brother
from Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi and the others in his Court who fled for
themselves and gave up the Ship.”
On being both an Iranian, a Citizen of the World generally and an American
specifically
“I, of course, will always be an Iranian. Yet in another sense,
I have also developed a better understanding of this country (America)
and its particular history, heritage, and unique role in the larger world.
In a most profound sense, I am now an American as well.”
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